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JACK M. BEERMANN

THE SUPREME COURT'S NARROW VIEW
ON CIVIL RIGHTS

The right to choose abortion, although recently significantly curtailed from its original scope,' is a federally protected liberty interest of women, and is at least protected against the imposition of
"undue burdens" by state and local government.2 Some of the most
serious threats to women's ability to choose abortion have come not
from government regulation, but from private, national, organized
efforts to prevent abortions. In addition to seeking change through
the political system, some of these organizations, most notably
Operation Rescue, have focused on the providers of abortion, and
have attempted to prevent abortions by forcibly closing abortion
clinics and harassing and intimidating women and employees entering the clinics. These groups do not shy away from using illegal
Jack M. Beermann is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Boston
University School of Law.
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' Compare Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 112 S Ct 2791 (1992)
and Webster v Reproductive Health Servs, 492 US 490 (1989) with Roe v Wade, 410 US 113
(1973); Doe v Bolton, 410 US 179 (1973) and Tbornburgb v American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 US 747 (1986).
2 See Casey, 112 S Ct 2791 (1992). See also Jane Maslow Cohen, A Jurisprudenceof Doubt:
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choose for poor women who do not live close to an abortion provider.
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means to accomplish their goal.3 In Bray v Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic,4 the Supreme Court rejected the consensus among
lower federal courts5 that private conspiracies to blockade abortion
clinics were subject to federal court injunctions under 42 USC
§ 1985(3),6 a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1.7 Bray is the
latest in a line of decisions that has rendered empty the fortysecond Congress's promise of federal court protection against organized groups who interfere with individuals attempting to exercise
their federal constitutional rights.
Bray involved Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, often
referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act, now codified at 42 USC
§ 1985(3). The Ku Klux Klan Act was a direct response by Congress to widespread violence in the South against the newly freed
slaves and their allies for equal rights.8 The provision involved in
Bray provides, interalia, a cause of action in favor of parties injured
3 See John Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and Operation Rescue: A Historicaland Theoretical
Analysis, 48 Wash & Lee L Rev 77 (1991); Alissa Rubin, In God They Trespass: The Faces and
Faith Behind Operation Rescue, The Washington Post (May 16, 1993), p. cOl.
4 113 S Ct 753 (1993).

' See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v OperationRescue, 948 F2d 218 (6th Cir 1991); National
Organizationfor Women v OperationRescue, 914 F2d 582 (4th Cir 1990); New York State National
Organizationfor Women v Terry, 886 F2d 1339 (2d Cir 1989), cert denied, 495 US 947 (1990).
6 Section 1985(3) provides:
§ 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection
of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation,
or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or
advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully
qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of
Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on
account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act
in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
7 See ch 22, 17 Stat 13 (1871).
8 See Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal
Civil Rights Crimes, 67 Tulane L Rev 2113, 2140-46 (1993).
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by conspiracies to "depriv[e] any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws." 9 The Court in Bray was called upon to address

the applicability of this provision to Operation Rescue's efforts to
prevent women, by blockading and otherwise temporarily closing
abortion clinics, from having abortions.
Owing to inhospitable treatment by the Supreme Court,
§ 1985(3) has not, in its more than 120 years of existence, proven
10

to be a useful tool in efforts to secure the enjoyment of civil rights.
For its first eighty years, § 1985(3) lay dormant, because soon after

enactment, the Court held unconstitutional the criminal counter-

part to § 1985(3), on grounds equally applicable to § 1985(3) itself.1 '
Even after the clouds of unconstitutionality were carried away on
the winds of constitutional change, the Court remained unsympa-

thetic to the operation of § 1985(3).
In recent years, the Court has restricted the operation of section

1985(3) through a variety of limiting doctrines. In its first opinion
construing the statute, the Court held that the statute's equal protection and equal privileges and immunities language meant that
9 The statute also provides a cause of action against conspiracies entered into "for the
purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory
from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection
of the laws." The primary focus of the Court's decision in Bray was on the provision in
text, because the Court did not believe that the plaintiffs had raised below a claim under
the hindrance clause. The dissenters disagreed with this conclusion, but it is at least clear
that the lower courts did not actually decide a hindrance claim, and this article will only
raise the hindrance clause when relevant to understanding the main conspiracy provision.
'0 This is in line with the Court's generally conservative treatment of the Reconstructionera civil rights statutes. For most of the period following the Civil War, the Supreme Court
has been a conservatizing influence with regard to the enforcement of Reconstruction-era
civil rights statutes, generally narrowing their reach and holding some statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., The SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873); The Civil Rights Cases,
109 US 3 (1883) (holding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unconstitutional); see generally
Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Litigation, 30 Mich L Rev 1323 (1952);
Lawrence, 67 Tulane L Rev (cited in note 8). In recent years, the Court has also construed
modem civil rights statutes very narrowly, provoking a response from Congress in the form
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See note 155. The Bray decision has also prompted efforts
in Congress to pass specific legislation protecting abortion clinics from activities like those
carried out by Operation Rescue. This proposal, if enacted, would protect abortion clinics
but would not amend section 1985(3) and thus would not address the issues concerning
section 1985(3) discussed in this article. See proposed Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrandes
Act of 1993, S 636, 103rd Cong, 1st Sess (March 23, 1993).
1 See United States v Harris, 106 US 629 (1883); see also Baldwin v Franks, 120 US
678 (1887). This was consistent with the nineteenth-century Court's treatment of other
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes which, as noted above, were either held unconstitutional or construed so narrowly as to be useless.
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the statute was aimed primarily at conspiracies entered into by
government officials. 1 2 This virtually eliminated any role for

§ 1985(3) in combating private activity that prevented the exercise
of constitutional rights. The Court later expressed serious doubts
concerning the correctness of this view, 13 but erected two limita-

tions on the scope of section 1985(3) in its place, both of which
serve to restrict severely the scope of the statute's remedy. First,

the Court has required, relying on the use of the word "equal" in
the statute, that the conspirators act out of class-based animus.
The Court has not yet recognized any such animus beyond that
based on race, and has expressed doubts that any non-racial classification can satisfy this requirement. 14 Second, while the Griffin
Court recognized that the statute reaches private conspiracies to
violate constitutional rights, 15 the Court subsequently held in Carpenters that a section 1985(3) action against a purely private conspiracy can reach only those few constitutional rights that are capable
of violation by private actors.16 These two requirements serve to
severely restrict the utility of section 1985(3) against private conspiracies to deny constitutional rights. 17
In Bray, these Court-imposed requirements doomed the plaintiffs' claim that Operation Rescue's blockades of abortion clinics
12 See

Collins v Hardyman, 341 US 651, 660-62 (1951). For a fuller explanation of this,

see notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
13 See Griffin v Breckenridge, 403 US 88 (1971).
14Id at 102 n 9. See also United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v Scott, 463 US 825,
836 (1983) ("It is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based
animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause, most
notably Republicans."); Bray, 113 S Ct at 759.
Is Griffin, 403 US at 101.
16See Carpenters, 463 US at 831-34 (under § 1985, a private conspiracy cannot violate
First Amendment rights, but only those rights guaranteed against private as well as public
interference-rights under the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel). This may
be even more restrictive than Collins v Hardyman, which at least allowed that an extreme
private conspiracy could "work a deprivation of equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under laws." 341 US at 662. For example, private newspaper
censorship is not a First Amendment violation, and a firing by a private company without
a hearing does not violate due process. For state action doctrine generally, see Moose Lodge
No. 7 v Irvis, 407 US 163 (1972).
17The Court found in Bray that a claim under the separate hindrance clause was not
presented, but it addressed it anyway in response to the dissenters' that it was presented
and made out. The Court, in a somewhat speculative vein, noted that the equality language
appears also in the hindrance clause and that it would, in a properly presented case, import
the class-based animus and state action requirements into a hindrance claim, thus rendering
the hindrance clause also largely useless against private action directed against constitutional
rights. 113 S Ct at 765-67.
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could be enjoined by federal courts using § 1985(3).18 The Court
held that the class-based animus requirement was not met because
19
opposition to abortion was not equal to animus against women
and because the class of women seeking abortions was not a proper
class under § 1985(3).2" The Court further held that Operation
Rescue's activities did not violate either the right to travel or the
right to abortion. The plaintiffs had relied primarily upon the right
to travel since it is protected against private interference, and a
large percentage of the women served by the clinics blockaded in
Bray traveled from out of state to the clinics. The Court rejected
both rights as bases for the § 1985(3) claim, the right to travel
because women from out of state were treated no worse than
women from within the state, and the right to abortion because it
is not protected against private interference. Thus, a conspiracy to
use illegal means to prevent women from exercising the federal
right to have an abortion is not actionable under § 1985(3).
The Supreme Court has relied on two related bases for reading
§ 1985(3) so narrowly. First, the Court has expressed doubts about
the constitutionality of a federal statute that would outlaw all private conspiracies aimed at depriving people of constitutionally protected interests. Second, the Court has stated that it is important
to limit § 1985(3) so that it does not become a general federal tort
law, displacing state law whenever a conspiracy exists. These two
concerns, rooted in federalism, are closely related to grounds the
Court has relied upon for reading other Reconstruction-era civil
rights laws narrowly, 2 1 yet neither is a persuasive reason for the
18There is another interesting issue of whether injunctive relief is available under section
1985(3). The section itself provides only for a damages remedy, but as originally passed in
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the section allowed, in addition to the damages remedy, for
the same remedies as provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Civil Rights Act of
1866, in turn, contemplated a civil action in federal district court, and did not specify the
remedy available. See Civil Rights Act (Enforcement Act) of 1866, ch 31, 14 Star 27, now
codified at 42 USC § 1988. The lower court in Bray held that under the federal courts'
general remedial discretion, injunctive relief was appropriate. The Supreme Court did not
reach the issue. See 113 S Ct at 767 n 16.
19Bray, 113 S Ct at 759. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether "vomen in
general" constitutes a qualifying class under § 1985(3).
20 Id at 759-60.
21See, e.g., Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 187-92 (1961) ("person" in § 1983 does not
include municipalities); Monell v Departmentof Social Services'ofCity of New York, 436 US 658
(1978) ("person" includes municipality but municipalities are not liable under ordinary tort
rules of respondeat superior); Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547 (1967) (provision in § 1983 making
all "persons" liable does not overrule common law government official immunities). In the
criminal civil rights context, Professor Lawrence has referred to these concerns as the federalism and vagueness problems. See Lawrence, 67 Tulane L Rev at 2119 (cited in note 8).
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limits the Court has imposed in this or other contexts. In short,
there is no constitutional problem with federal court remedies
against private individuals who conspire to deprive people of their
constitutional rights even if the conspiracy is not motivated by
racial animus, and § 1985(3)'s requirement that the conspirators act
for the purpose of depriving their victims of constitutional rights
(equal protection or equal privileges and immunities) eliminates the
potential that § 1985(3) might displace large portions of state tort
law.
This article explores the issues raised by Bray as follows. Part I
explores the conditions that brought about § 1985(3), how those
conditions shaped the statute, and how the statute was received
in the Court soon after its passage. Part II analyzes, in light of
that history, the development of current doctrine for applying
§ 1985(3), and traces that development to current § 1985(3) doctrine.
Part III looks closely at the principal limiting doctrines, critiques
how they were applied in Bray, and proposes rules in their place
that would answer the Court's federalism concerns while making
§ 1985(3) a much more effective remedy against private conspiracies
to prevent people from exercising constitutional rights. Part IV
concludes with some observations regarding the Court's role, since
the Civil War, in protecting civil rights.
I
Beginning in 1866, as part of the program of Reconstruction
22
of the Union after the Civil War, the postbellum Congress,
through civil rights legislation, made several attempts to protect
the rights of the newly freed slaves and their political allies both
from government and private discrimination. 3 Many impediments
to full participation in society for the newly freed slaves had arisen,
and they were created by governmental units, government officials,
and private resistance, most notably through the Ku Klux Klan,
which enjoyed a very large membership among Southern white

22 Sometimes over presidential veto; e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch 31, 14 Stat 29-30

(1866).
23These include Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch 114, 18 Stat 335 (1875); Ku Klux Klan Act,
ch 22, 17 Stat 13 (1871); Enforcement Act of 1870, ch 114, 16 Stat 140, amended by Act
of Feb 28, 1871, ch 99, 16 Stat 433; and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch 31, 14 Stat 27.
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men at that time.24 On the government side, some states attempted
to restrict black ownership of property and discriminated in the
provision of civil remedies, thus making it difficult or impossible
for blacks to engage in economic activity. Further, restrictions were
placed on the freed slaves' right to vote, and facially neutral criminal laws were enforced in a discriminatory fashion so that blacks
were punished severely and those who victimized blacks were not
punished at all. Finally, there were instances in which government
officials assaulted blacks and their supporters. These attacks went
unpunished, thus tending to provide the appearance of government
approval to official and private mistreatment of blacks.
Private violence and discrimination against blacks was also
viewed by Congress as a serious impediment to full integration
into society for the newly freed slaves. There was widespread discrimination in public accommodations such as restaurants and hotels and discrimination in everyday economic transactions. It was
also common for whites to act violently toward blacks, and there
were several notorious examples of mob violence against blacks
25
that were not adequately dealt with by state and local authorities.
The content of the statutes passed by Congress between 1866 and
1875 can be traced to particular problems that generally fall into
these categories of both public and private hostility to equality for
black citizens, and the combination of public and private violence
makes it difficult to distinguish provisions motivated by one or the
other.
The legislation attacked the problems that blacks were facing in
the South just after the war through a variety of means, including
creating civil and criminal penalties for private interference with
voting 26 and the exercise of other rights; 27 creating remedies against
official deprivations of federal rights; 28 creating substantive rights
24See Collins, 341 US at 662; see generally Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the
Constitution: A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 Tex L Rev 527, 534-36 (1985).
" See Lawrence, 67 Tulane L Rev at 2133-35 (cited in note 8) (discussing riots in Memphis, New Orleans, and Colfax, Louisiana); Gormley, 64 Tex L Rev at 543 n 40 (cited in
note 24).
26The Enforcement Act of 1870, § 4, provides that a person who is hindered or otherwise
intimidated while exercising the right to vote shall receive $500 from the offending party.
27The Enforcement Act of 1870, § 17, provides a criminal penalty against any public
official who interferes with the Act's guarantee in § 16 that all persons shall enjoy the full
and equal benefit of all laws, including the right to make and enforce contracts, to fully

participate in court proceedings, and to receive equal punishment.
2 Enforcement Act of 1870, § 17; Ku Klux Klan Act, § 1; Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2.
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such as granting all persons in the United States the same right as
"white citizens" to make and enforce contracts, the right to own
property, and the right to use public accommodations; 29 and making conspiracies to deny equal protection and equal privileges and
30
immunities crimes and actionable for civil damages.
These statutes have certain features in common. 3 They do not
single out newly freed slaves as the only proper plaintiffs but rather
grant rights generally to all potential victims of the specified deprivations. 32 Further, the statutes are largely directed at individuals,
both government officials and private citizens, rather than at gov33
ernmental units.
While the form of civil rights legislation was influenced most
heavily by the precise problems blacks were facing after the end
of slavery, the decision to aim the statutes primarily at individuals
rather than at governmental units appears to have arisen from pressure brought by some members of Congress to preserve as much
of the original federalist structure as possible. The choice to employ
primarily judicial remedies, both civil and criminal, and against
individuals rather than governmental units, was arrived at after
balancing several considerations, including effectiveness in protecting federal rights against both public and private violation, ease
of administration, and respect for state and local government authority. Criminal and civil remedies against individuals might not
be as effective as federal official intervention into the operation of
state and local government, but they can be considerably less intrusive on government and thus were arrived at as an appropriate
29Enforcement Act of 1870, § 16; Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1; Civil Rights Act of 1875,
§ I (held unconstitutional in The Civil Rights Cases). While the first two did not specify any
remedy, the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 Act provided
a $500 civil penalty to be recovered by the aggrieved party from the violating party.
30Ku Klux Klan Act, § 2 etc.
31See generally Lawrence, 67 Tulane L Rev 2113 (cited in note 8).
32The exceptions here are 42 USC § 1981 (derived from the Enforcement Act of 1870)
and 42 USC § 1982 (derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866). These provisions grant all
persons the same right, inter alia, to make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, and own
property, as "white citizens." Despite the seeming illogic of applying the language to protect
the rights of whites, the Court has allowed white persons to sue under § 1981 on reasoning
that may apply equally to § 1982. See McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 US 273
(1976) (§ 1981 protects whites). See alsoJonesv AlfredH. Mayer Co., 392 US 409, 437 (1968)
(characterizing § 1982 as prohibiting "all racial discrimination ... in the sale and rental of
property.").
33Section 1983 is the exception, since it applies both to individuals and municipalities
but, according to the Court, not to state governments. See Monell, 436 US at 658; Will v
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58 (1989).
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method for ensuring that state and local governments recognized
the rights of the newly freed slaves while at the same time not
unnecessarily intruding on the authority of those governments.
From the start, this legislation did not fare well in the Supreme
Court.34 The Court developed a constitutional theory, rooted in
concerns of proper federal-state relations, that confined some of
the statutes to a relatively narrow sphere, and provisions that could
not credibly be construed to meet the Court's requirements were
declared unconstitutional. The basic doctrinal premise under
which the Court operated (and still employs to a great extent) was
that the Fourteenth Amendment addressed only state action, primarily state laws that were contrary to the Due Process, Equal
Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses." The Court
took very literally the language in the Fourteenth Amendment limiting its effect to state action. The Fourteenth Amendment itself
did not reach private conduct at all, or, in the Court's words,
"Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
of the amendment."36 Along the same line of reasoning, the Court
has stated that the Fourteenth Amendment does not create any
individual rights but rather prohibits states from taking certain
adverse actions against individuals. 37 This state-action-only theory
of the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment still governs our understanding of the amendment today.38
" See, e.g., The SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873); UnitedStates v Cruikshank,
92 US 542 (1876); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883); United States v Harris, 106 US
629 (1883). For a discussion of the "dreadful decade" from 1873 to 1883, in which most
Reconstruction era civil rights legislation was sharply narrowed by the Supreme Court, see
Gormley, 64 Tex L Rev at 541-46 (cited in note 24). While the Court's resistance to civil
rights legislation might be chalked up to the prevailing views of the time, I view this more
as an explanation than an excuse. Leaders in Congress, subject to the direct political pressure
of periodic re-election, were much more progressive than the politically insulated members
of the Supreme Court, a pattern that has repeated itself often since. Compare Randall
Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of ProfessorSchmidt, 86
Colum L Rev 1622 (1986). In racial, political, and economic matters, the nineteenth-century
Supreme Court was not a progressive institution.
" The Court first held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause would not federalize
the great body of civil rights at the federal level-only a small subset of rights arising from
national citizenship. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36, 79-80 (1873); United
States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 554-55 (1876). The state action requirement was enunciated
in Cruikshank, United States v Harris, 106 US 629, 637-39 (1883) and The Civil Rights Cases,
109 US 3, 26 (1883).
3 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US at 11.
3'United States v Harris, 106 US 629 (1883).
3 See, e.g., United States v Price, 383 US 787, 799 (1966); Moose Lodge No. 7 v Irvis, 407
US 163 (1972); Great American FederalSavings & Loan Assn. v Novotny, 442 US 366, 372
(1979) (§ 1985(3) does not create new substantive rights; the rights it vindicates must have
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The primary theoretical justification the Court relied upon for
its construction of the Reconstruction-era amendments and statutes
was regard for the proper division of authority over personal relations between the states and the federal government. Under the
view prevailing at the Supreme Court during and for a long time
after the Reconstruction era, the only legitimate federal interests
were abolishing actual slavery and voiding all state laws contrary to
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Except for abolishing
involuntary servitude, the regulation of relationships among private
individuals, including crimes, tort law, and property and contract
law, was a matter of state law, and federal intervention into these
areas was a threat to the basic principles governing the allocation
39
of power between the federal and state governments.
This theoretical background is most clearly seen in the Court's
discussion of the idea that Congress, legislating pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, could reach private conduct. The Court
rejected any notion that the Fourteenth Amendment might "invest
Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within
the domain of State legislation ....

It does not authorize Congress

to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private
rights. ' ° All aspects of relations among private individuals were
seen as matters of private and, therefore, state law.
The Court's conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment itself
did not reach private conduct did not answer the question whether
Congress intended, or had the power to, reach private conduct in
the civil rights statutes of the immediate post-Civil War period.
More particularly, that the Fourteenth Amendment itself reaches
only state action does not answer whether Congress's enforcement
power, granted in § 5 of the amendment, includes the power to
reach private conduct that threatens Fourteenth Amendment interests. In the immediate post-Civil War era, the Court did not really
separate the two issues, holding that § 5 of the amendment grants
Congress only the power to enforce the actual effect of the substantive provisions of the amendment itself. Thus, congressional efforts
an existence of their own-First and Fourteenth Amendment rights do not exist without
state action).
39This is what Professor Lawrence denominates the "federalism problem." See Lawrence,
67 Tulane L Rev at 2118-22 (cited in note 8). The Court probably also believed that no
law, state or federal, should intervene into private social relations, but the dominant concern
was the division of authority between state and federal governments.
40 109 US at 11.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment to reach private civil rights violations were unconstitutional as beyond Congress's power.
The Court saw a difference between the enforcement power
granted in the Fourteenth Amendment and other federal powers
such as the commerce power. While Congress might have plenary
power to regulate all aspects of matters falling within a power
enumerated in Article I of the Constitution, the enforcement power
of the Fourteenth Amendment was granted only for the purpose
of enforcing the amendment's ban on certain state laws or practices,
and therefore Congress could not legislate any further than the
reach of the amendment. While some constitutional provisions,
such as the Commerce Clause, granted Congress powers over a
broadly defined subject area, the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power was different. The Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power granted Congress only the power to remedy violations
of the amendment. Thus, while Congress might legislate broadly
over interstate commerce,41 it may not legislate to protect generally
Fourteenth Amendment interests. Rather, legislation may be directed only at actual violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Since private conduct could not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, public accommodations legislation directed at private innkeepers, for example, and even legislation directed at private conspiracies to prevent people from exercising constitutional rights,
was held beyond Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.42
This construction of the Fourteenth Amendment was accompanied by a narrow-view of the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Although the Court acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment addressed private conduct, the Court early on held that the
Thirteenth Amendment's reach was confined to eliminating slavery. It was simply, to the Court, not slavery for a private individual
to discriminate on the basis of race or even to beat or kill a person
because of his or her race.43 While the Court might concede that
people have a right, in the abstract sense, to equal access to places
41In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court suggested that Congress might pass public accommodations civil rights legislation under its commerce power, but not under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 109 US at 18.
42 109 US at 11.

41Id at 24.
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of public accommodation, this right was not granted to blacks by
the Thirteenth Amendment but rather was "one of those rights
which the states by the Fourteenth Amendment are forbidden to
deny to any person."' Since, according to the Court, the "Thirteenth Amendment has respect, not to distinctions of race, class,
or color, but to slavery," it did not grant Congress the power to
pass public accommodations laws or laws regarding private violence against blacks.
It should be obvious that not all of the constitutional underpinnings to the Supreme Court's treatment of the Reconstruction-era
civil rights statutes remain the law. While it is still accepted law
that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only state action, the
Court has made it much easier for Congress to reach private action
in legislation enforcing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Two key changes in Court doctrine have brought this
about. First, the Court has construed the Thirteenth Amendment's
reach more broadly than merely eliminating the actual relationship
of slavery. The Court has characterized the amendment as abolishing all the badges and incidents of slavery, and these include both
official and private acts of discrimination against blacks.45 Congress
now has broad power to identify and regulate the badges and incidents of slavery under its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
power, including the power to reach private action. Second, although it has expressed some doubts, it appears likely that the
Court would allow Congress the power to legislate against private
infringements of the interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has already recognized congressional power, with
regard to government official conduct, to go far beyond the judicially recognized reach of the amendment. Under prevailing doctrine, Congress may create new rights and provide remedies to see
that these new rights are recognized.' The Court has rejected its
earlier view that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment en'4 Id.
' SeeJonesvAlfredH. Mayer Co., 392 US 409(1968) (§1982 bars all racial discrimination,
private as well as public, and the statute is a valid exercise of congressional power to enforce
the Thirteenth Amendment).
' That Congress could reach private conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
was asserted in Congress during framing of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, but the Supreme
Court has not yet so held. See Cong Globe, 42d Cong, ist Sess 367-68, 607-08 (1871).
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forcement powers are fundamentally different from other powers
granted in Article I of the Constitution, and has subjected legislation under those powers to the minimal rational basis scrutiny
47
applied to most legislation under Congress's Article I powers.
This test, which Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation would
meet easily, 48 requires only that Congress might rationally have
believed that an action would advance constitutionally legitimate
goals.
Under this expansive view of Congress's power to legislate under
the post-Civil War amendments, Congress could attack all impediments to full equality and rights. Congress would have broad authority to identify government and private practices that threaten
the values underlying the amendments, prescribe substantive standards regulating those practices, and create remedies to enforce
those standards. Thus, even though private conduct cannot violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could regulate private racial
discrimination and private racial violence to advance the Fourteenth Amendment value of a non-racist society.
This view of Congress's power fits neatly into twentieth-century
developments regarding federalism limits on congressional power. 49
Congressional assertions of regulatory power are now subjected to
only the most minimal judicial scrutiny, and Congress has not
been shy about exercising extensive regulatory power in areas that
nineteenth-century judges would have identified as areas within
state control.5" This expansion of federal regulatory power has en7 See Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641 (1966).
48 It is not difficult to imagine how Congress in 1866, 1871, or 1875 might rationally have

believed that in order to promote equality before the law it was necessary to protect persons
and groups from private conspiracies against the exercise of constitutional rights.
49 See UnitedStates v Darby, 312 US 100 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v UnitedStates,
379 US 241, (1964); Garciav San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 US 528 (1985).
SoSee Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin in public accommodations, restaurants,
employment, housing, and education). The Court has recognized broad power to legislate
regarding private discrimination under the commerce power. See Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427
US 445 (1976) (Congress has power, under the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment, to override state Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and subject states to
liability for discrimination in employment); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States, 379
US at 258-61 (1964) (Tide II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination
in places of private accommodation, does not work a deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law, nor a taking of property without just compensation, and is
within Congress's commerce power).
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tailed a massive shift in governmental power from state government
to the federal government, and to a great extent, judicial doctrine
in other areas has been consistent with this shift."1

In the area of federal civil rights actions, the potentially radical
implications of this view of federalism have not been realized. 2 The
text, legislative history, and social context underlying § 1985(3) all
indicate that the statute was intended to be part of a sweeping

federal charter of liberty, granting remedies when private or public
groups of individuals prevented people from enjoying their constitutional rights. Limiting doctrines, detailed in the following sections, rooted in the Reconstruction-era Supreme Court's constitutional dogma, have prevented § 1985(3) from becoming an effective

tool for ensuring that people can actually enjoy their federal rights.
The section that follows traces the doctrinal development of
§ 1985(3) under which Bray was litigated and asks whether the
Court's understanding and application of the statute is consistent
with contemporary understandings of congressional power and federalism.
II
The life of § 1985(3) can be divided into three stages. The
first stage, from enactment until 1951, can be characterized as dormant because all indications were that the Court would find the
statute unconstitutional for the same reason that it had struck down
§ 1985(3)'s criminal counterpart. The second stage, running from
1951 until 1971, is the period in which the Court construed the
statute to reach public action only and to be inapplicable to private
conspiracies. The final stage, which represents the doctrine prevailing since 1971, allows actions against private conspiracies, but limits the reach of the statute to those private conspiracies involving
either joint action with public officials or constitutional rights that
can be violated by private action, such as the right to travel. In
addition, the Court held that the conspiracy must be motivated
"' With the exception of some civil rights areas, in which the Court has been particularly
sensitive to the federalism aspects of potential civil rights remedies. See Younger v Harris,
401 US 37 (1971); City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95 (1983).
52 See Jack M. Beermann, A CriticalApproacb to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources
of Law, 42 Stan L Rev 51, 84-88 (1989) (discussing limits on § 1983 actions based on
federalism concerns).
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by racial or perhaps some analogous class-based bias, thus further
restricting both public and private § 1985(3) actions. These stages
3
are discussed below.5
A

The first case involving § 1985(3) reached the Supreme Court in
1951, eighty years after its passage. This is because in its 1882
54
term, in United States v Harris,
the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional § 1985(3)'s criminal counterpart" on grounds that
would be equally applicable to the civil conspiracy provision.
The Court in Harris held that Congress lacked constitutional
power to criminalize private conspiracies to deprive persons of due
process and equal protection. The defendants in Harris were indicted for conspiring to assault, beat, and in one case kill people
who had been arrested and were in custody awaiting trial. The
Court construed the language of § 1985(3) (appearing identically in
its criminal counterpart) to reach private conspiracies, and then
considered whether § 1985(3) was a permissible use of Congress's
powers under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendment. On the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court held that, even
though Congress might reach private conduct under the amendment, the statute went far beyond any conception of slavery-the
Court noted that the statute reached even a conspiracy among
blacks to deprive whites of equal protection, a result that could not
be based on congressional power to outlaw slavery. 6 Similarly, the
Court rejected the Fifteenth Amendment as a basis for § 1985(3)
7
on the ground that the statute went far beyond voting rights.5
These grounds are examples of the nineteenth-century Court's con-

" Other doctrines have also been created to limit § 1985(3)'s scope, largely involving the
equal protection and equal privileges and immunities aspects of the statute. These additional
limitations are addressed below in subsections B and C.
106 US 629 (1883).
55At the time, § 1985(3)'s criminal counterpart was codified at Revised Statutes Section
5519. Section 1985(3) itself has been codified in several different places: the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, 17 Stat 13; Rev Stat § 1980 (1878); 8 USC § 47(3); 42 USC § 1985(C) (1976);
42 USC 1985(3). For convenience, the current placement of the civil conspiracy provision
at 42 USC § 1985(3) in the United States Code will be referred to throughout the text of
this article.
56 Harris, 106 US at 641.
'4

" Id at 637.
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sistently narrow reading of the amendments and Congress's power
under them.
The Court also rejected, on state action grounds, the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments as bases for Congress's power to enact
§ 1985(3). The Court characterized the Fifteenth Amendment as
not granting to anyone the right to vote but rather as voiding any
state law or practice that amounted to "'discrimination in the enjoyment of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."' 58 With regard to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court also stated, relying on several previously
decided cases under that amendment, that the amendment restrains
only state action, and Congress has no power to legislate beyond
the bounds of the amendment itself.59
This reasoning was consistent with the fabric of the Court's
treatment of the post-Civil War civil rights statutes, under which
the Court consistently held that Congress lacked the power to reach
private conduct through civil rights legislation.6" And the Court's
reasoning applied equally to the civil action for damages against
conspiracies granted in § 1985(3). The Court in Harrisdid not rely
at all on the criminal aspect of the case or the particular penalty
provision of the statute. It relied only on Congress's attempt to go
beyond the provisions of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments by regulating relationships among private individuals
outside the context of actual slavery. Because the reasoning applied
equally to civil and criminal actions, the civil provision was as
ineffectual as if it had also been declared unconstitutional.
B

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, several civil cases were brought
in federal court under § 1985(3), most arising out of politically
motivated violence. 6 While the civil conspiracy provision that is
58Id, quoting United States v Reese, 92 US 214 (1875).
59Harris, 106 US at 638-39, citing The Slaughter House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873);
United States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542 (1876); Virginia v Rives, 100 US 313 (1879).
60In the years following the Civil War, the Court held other civil rights statutes unconstitutional for very similar reasons. See notes I0-I1; see also Collins, 341 US at 657 n 10; U.S.
v Cruikshank, 92 US 542 (1876); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883).
61 See Hardyman v Collins, 80 F Supp 501 (SD Cal 1948), reversed, 183 F2d 308 (9th Cir
1950), reversed sub nom, Collins v Hardyman, 341 US 651 (1951) (defendants, all private
individuals, allegedly violently broke up a meeting of the plaintiffs' organization at which
the Marshall plan was to be discussed and criticized); see also Robeson v Fanelli, 94 F Supp 62
(SDNY 1950) (defendants, including private individuals and government officials, allegedly
conspired to disrupt a concert and gathering at which political issues were to be discussed);
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§ 1985(3) had not technically been held unconstitutional along with
its criminal counterpart, there were several formidable obstacles in
the statute's text and nineteenth-century doctrine to the statute
becoming an effective tool against private conspiracies.
Ironically, the Court's invalidation of the criminal provision was
strong authority that as a matter of statutory text § 1985(3) reached
private conspiracies. Recall that the reason the Court held the criminal provision unconstitutional was that it reached private conspiracies6" and that this was beyond Congress's power. 63 As one lower
court noted, the Supreme Court held that "a statute identical in
part with [§ 1985(3)] was directed 'exclusively against the action
of private persons.' " The congressional intent to reach private
conspiracies was, to some, evident from the language describing
the potential defendants in § 1985(3) suits-the statute refers to
"two or more persons" either conspiring or going in disguise on
the highway. Government officials were obviously not the targets
of the "disguise" provision, and it would be incongruous to hold
that private parties may be sued under the disguise provision but
only government officials were the intended targets of the prohibition against other conspiracies." Some courts, ultimately including
the Supreme Court, ignored these arguments and held that the
statute was intended only to reach actions of public officials. 66 One
argument for this was the statute's focus on conspiracies to deny
"equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws."6 7 In the most explicit discussions of the meaning
of the word equal, two different theories emerged, one that held
that the "equal protection" and "equal privileges and immunities"
language implied state action68 (and thus private conspiracies were
Ferrerv FrontonExbibition Co., 188 F2d 954(5th Cir 1951) (defendants fired plaintiff jai alai
players in retaliation for their membership in an organization and hired illegal immigrants
in their places).
62 This point was not really analyzed by the HarrisCourt but rather was taken for granted,
which, given how recent the statute had been passed, should be strong evidence that Congress intended the statute to reach private conspiracies.
63 See Harris, 106 US at 639.
6Hardyman, 183 F2d at 311, quoting UnitedStates v Harris, 106 US at 640.
65Hardyman, 183 F2d at 311.
66See Collins v Hardyman, 341 US 651 (1951).
67Section 1985(3) (emphasis added).
68Hardyman, 80 F Supp at 506. Other courts holding that § 1985(3) did not reach private
conspiracies reasoned more generally, without relying on specific statutory language, that
the civil rights acts required action under color of law or state action. See Love v Chandler,
124 F2d 785 (8th Cir 1942); Viles v Symes, 129 F2d 828 (10th Cir 1942).
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not redressable under § 1985 (3)), and another that held that the
word "equal" meant no more than the violation of a right "which
is enjoyed equally by other citizens" (thus allowing actions against
purely private conspiracies).6 9 A middle position allowed that private conspiracies might implicate "equal" rights but only if the
conspiracy was an attempt to influence government officials to treat
70
the victims of the conspiracy unequally.
The other significant problem that advocates of private conspiracy based § 1985(3) suits had to face were the implications of the
nineteenth-century Supreme Court's invalidation of the statute's
criminal counterpart. Lower courts could not ignore the fact that
the Supreme Court had held that there was no congressional power
to reach private conspiracies directed at constitutional rights. To
avoid the reach of Harris,a pair of lower court decisions developed
a theory that granted Congress the power to protect a limited set
of federal rights against private conduct. 7 The theory was that
while most Fourteenth Amendment rights existed only with regard
to the relationship between citizens and the states, § 1985(3) could
be employed to attack conspiracies against the exercise of a special
category of federal rights that implicated the relationship between
citizens and the federal government. These included, inter alia, the
right to assemble for the purpose of discussing national issues and
petitioning the government for the redress of grievances. The idea
was that the federal government has a special interest in constitutional rights that affect the relationship of citizens to the federal
government, and this interest implies expanded congressional
power.
The courts that allowed suits under § 1985(3) to challenge private
69Hardyman, 183 F2d at 312. The other principal case that allowed a § 1985(3) action
against a private conspiracy expressed general agreement with this opinion. Robeson, 94 F
Supp at 66-67.
" See Ferrerv Fronton Exhibition Co., 188 F2d 954, 956 (5th Cir 1951). This was partially
accepted by the Supreme Court in Collins, but only for extreme cases of private domination
of government.
7 See Robeson v Fanelli, 94 F Supp 62 (SDNY 1950); Hardyman, 183 F2d at 313. The
theory here was that some rights uniquely concern rights with regard to the federal government, and so Congress had power (perhaps under Article I) to protect those rights even
against private hindrance. Id at 314. Thus, in Robeson, the court dismissed claims based on
officials' failure to prevent conspiracies to deny equal protection, but allowed claims based
on a conspiracy to prevent discussion of national issues. The court reasoned that under
Harris, the statute cannot constitutionally be read to reach a private conspiracy to deny
equal protection. See Robeson, 94 F Supp at 67-69.
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political violence during this period were in the minority. Most
courts did not allow suits against private parties on the ground that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach private conduct and thus
neither could a civil rights statute passed under that amendment.
Had they followed the Supreme Court's earlier construction of
the same language, they might have held the statute unconstitutional as beyond Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power.72 But since even under the more restrictive view of congressional power, § 1985(3) (and its criminal counterpart) could have
some constitutional applications to state official conduct, at most
it might have been appropriate for the courts to strike down
§ 1985(3) in part, only insofar as it purported to reach private
conduct.
In Collins v Hardyman, the Supreme Court ignored the nineteenth-century Court's construction of § 1985(3)'s identically
phrased criminal counterpart and held that the statute did not reach
private conduct unless the conspiracy was so widespread that it
might "dominate and set at naught" the lawful governments and
"effectively deprive Negroes of their legal rights and to close all
avenues of redress or vindication. " Because it treated it as an open
question, 74 the Court apparently did not view Harris (its earlier
holding regarding the criminal statute) as authority on congressional power to provide a civil remedy for private discriminatory
violence.
The Court offered two justifications for its decision to construe
§ 1985(3) to reach, in the main, only public official action. First, the
Court noted that construing § 1985(3) to reach private conspiracies
72A more expansive view of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment did not
emerge until Katzenbacb v Morgan, 384 US 641 (1966). See also United States v Guest, 383
US 745 (1966). Implicit in the Supreme Court's holding in Griffin vBreckenridge that § 1985(3)
reaches private conduct is that Congress has power to reach private conduct in a civil rights
statute based on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. See the post-Giffin case
of Action v Gannon, 450 F2d 1227 (8th Cir 1977), which interpreted Griffin to hold that
§ 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies to violate Fourteenth Amendment rights and held
that Congress has the power to reach private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The seventh circuit disagreed with the eighth. See Murpry v Mount Carmel High School, 543
F2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir 1976); Cohen v IllinoisInstitute of Tecbnology, 524 F2d 818 (7th Cir
1975) (Stevens, J) (interpreting Griffin to require either state action or a right capable of
violation by private parties). The Supreme Court, in Carpenters and Bray, adopted the
seventh circuit's view of Griffin.
" Collins, 341 US at 662.
74Id.
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would present important constitutional problems regarding federalism and Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment.75
The Court hinted that if forced to construe the statute to reach
private conduct it might agree with Harris and hold the statute
unconstitutional. This justification has less to do with Congress's
intent and more to do with the .Court's attempt to avoid a constitutional question.
The Court also relied on the statutory references to "equal"
rights and "equal" privileges and immunities to construe the statute
to apply only to state action.7 6 The Court's analysis here is interesting on two distinct scores. First, the Court interpreted the "equal
protection" and "equal privileges and immunities" language to require that the object of the conspiracy be to affect the plaintiffs'
legal rights, somehow either to influence the law, or "obstruct or
interfere" with the operation of the law with regard to the plaintiffs'
rights.7 This is a refined version of the view that private parties
are incapable of denying equal protection. It recognizes that private
conduct can, in some circumstances, influence the operation of the
law so as to prevent people from exercising their rights, but the
conduct would have to influence the operation or availability of
legal institutions. 78 The Court apparently did not think that private
violence, based on a victim's group membership, could be characterized as a denial of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities.
The second significant aspect of the Court's state action analysis
is its characterization of the statute as requiring a deprivation of
equality and not reaching conspiracies to deprive people of just
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 79 The lower
court had held that a civil action under § 1985(3) could be brought
any time a conspiracy resulted in the deprivation of a federal constitutional right. The court of appeals had relied on the language in
the remedial portion of the statute that grants the action for dam" Id at 659.

71Id at 660-61.
71Id at 661.
78Id at 662. This view was also adopted by some members of Congress during the debates
on the statute. See Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess, 456-82 (187 1). See generally Stephanie
M. Wildman, 42 USC § 1985(3)-a Private Action to Vindicate Fourteenth Amendment Rigbts:
A Paradox Resolved, 17 San Diego L Rev 317 (1980).
'9 See § 1985(3), as quoted in Collins, 341 US at 660.
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ages to any person "injured in his person or property, or deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.""° The Supreme Court held that this reference in
the remedial portion of the statute to any federal right concerned
only the result of the conspiracy, and that only conspiracies directed at equality of rights met the substantive requirements of the
81

statute.

Limiting the scope of the cause of action created by § 1985(3) to
state action directed at deprivations of equality rendered the statute
virtually useless as a tool for securing the full enjoyment of rights.
To the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, preventing state deprivation of rights
was not sufficient to guarantee the enjoyment of federal rights,
because states might be "unable or unwilling" 82 to preserve those
rights against both public and private attack. While they may have
understood that the Fourteenth Amendment itself would operate
only against state action, they thought that they had the power to
ensure enjoyment of Fourteenth Amendment rights by legislating
against private action interfering with the exercise of those rights,
and by passing § 1985(3) they thought they had exercised that
power.
C

The doctrinal framework under which Bray was decided was
established by the Court in the 1971 decision of Griffin v Breckenridge.83 That decision loosened up somewhat on the Court's earlier
0 Section 1985(3). As noted above, the court of appeals did not think the equality language
was important, holding that it meant that a person was deprived of a right possessed by all
others. See Hardyman, 183 F2d at 312. Note that since this section contemplates damages
for the violation of a right or for injury to property or person, damages under § 1985(3)
should not be limited to damages for actual injury as in § 1983 cases. See Memphis Community
School Dist. v Stacbura, 477 US 299 (1986) (§ 1983 damages are limited to compensation for
injuries recognized at common law; no damages for the mere deprivation of a right without
further injury).
"1Other provisions of the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, most notably § 1983,
are more broad in that they grant remedies for violations of any federal right. See Neil H.
Cogan, Section 198S(3)s Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texts, History, Progress, and
Cynicism, 39 Rutgers L Rev 515, 549-53 (1987).
82 See Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 175 (1961) (discussing why Congress did not intend
to limit § 1983 actions, derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, to official conduct
in conformity with state law).
83 403 US 88 (1971).
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view that only the most extreme private conspiracies were within
§ 1985(3)'s reach,84 but it established two other requirements that
have narrowed greatly the statute's scope. First, the Griffin Court
held that § 1985(3)'s equality language means that the conspiracy
must be motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus[.] 85 Second, by focusing
on the right to travel claims presented in the complaint, the Griffin
Court laid the groundwork for the principle that private conspiracies are actionable only when they violate constitutional rights that
86
are protected, as a constitutional matter, from private invasion.
The changes in interpretation of § 1985(3) have not been justified
by the sorts of arguments that typically accompany abandonment
of prior statutory interpretation.8 7 There is little indication in any
of the Court's opinions that the current interpretation of § 1985(3)
is based upon a better understanding of congressional intent than88
prior Courts or commentators that have read § 1985(3) differently.
The Court rarely refers in a serious way to the nineteenth-century
Congress's views. Rather, the interpretation the Court has settled
on for now was arrived at largely under the influence of constitutional considerations including the desire to avoid transforming a
great number of state torts and crimes into federal torts and crimes,
doubts about Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment
to reach private conduct, and the view that it is incongruous to
think of private action threatening rights protected by the Constitution itself only against state action.
i. The Griffin Court read § 1985(3)'s equality language to require
that offending conspiracies be motivated by class-based animus.
That Court rejected the Collins Court's holding that the equality
84This development is discussed below in Part liA.

85Griffin, 403 US at 102.
8'See Griffin, 403 US at 105-6, as discussed in United Brotherhoodof Carpenters v Scott,
463 US at 832-33.
S7See generally Jay I. Sabin, Clio and the CourtRedux: Toward a Dynamic Mode of Interpreting
Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Laws, 23 Colum J L & Soc Probs 369 (1990) (discussing
methods of interpreting Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes and advocating a "dynamic"
approach).
88 See Steven F. Schatz, The Second Death of 42 USC § 1985(3): The Use and Misuse of History
in Statutory Interpretation, 27 BC L Rev 911 (1986); Sabin, 23 Colum J L & Soc Probs 369
(cited in note 87); Mark Fockele, Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of its
OriginalPurpose, 46 U Chi L Rev 402, 417 (1979). Compare Monell v Dept. of Social Services
of City of New York, 436 US 658 (1978) (overruling prior interpretation of § 1983 based on
reevaluation of legislative history).
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language signified a statutory state action requirement reasoning
that only a conspiracy among state actors could work a deprivation
"of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities
under the law." In light of the overwhelming evidence that Congress
intended to reach private conspiracies with § 1985(3), the Grffin
Court rejected this state action interpretation of the equality language,89 but read that same language to require that the conspiracy
be motivated by racial or "perhaps" some other sort of class-based
animus.9" Both of these readings reject the court of appeals in Collins's view that the only importance of the word "equal" was that
the conspirators must91have treated the victim differently than other
citizens were treated.
The opinion in Griffin documented thoroughly the textual and
historical evidence of congressional intent to reach private conspiracies. The conclusion that the principal aim of § 1985(3) was action
by government officials was plainly wrong in light of Congress's
direct intention in § 1985(3) to attack the Ku Klux Klan and similar
groups. Although many of these groups may have counted Democratic Party government officials among their members, they were
private organizations and did not act under color of law. The most
powerful pieces of evidence indicating that Congress intended the
statute to reach private conspiracies, both relied upon by the Griffin
Court, are the "disguise" and "hindrance" provisions of § 1985(3).
The "disguise" provision, which extends the statute's reach to
groups that go in disguise on the highway, is discussed above. The
hindrance provision reaches conspiracies or action by persons in
disguise that "hinder the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State
or Territory the equal protection of the laws." 92 This provision is
aimed at private parties hindering government authorities, and is
thus not aimed at state action. 93 And there is no mention in the
general conspiracy provision of any requirement that the conspirators be state actors, which would be expected if the conspiracy
' For a discussion of this development, see notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
90See Gtiffin, 403 US at 102, discussed at notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
91See Hardyman, 183 F2d at 312.
92 Quotes are from § 1985(3).
9'Since the hindrance provision achieves this independently, its existence should also
rebut the suggestion that any private conspiracy reachable under § 1985(3) must have, as
its aim, the disruption of government protection of rights.
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section was to be so limited and yet stand alongside two provisions
obviously aimed at private parties.
There is also plentiful evidence in addition to the text of § 1985(3)
to support applying the statute to private conspiracies. The Reconstruction-era Congress addressed several statutes at government
actors only, using the familiar "under color of law" formulation,
the best example of which is 42 USC § 1983, which was passed as
part of the same statute as § 1985(3). Congress did not, however,
insert such language into § 1985(3). 94 Further, the historical background against which § 1985 (3) was drafted belies the notion that
it was designed to reach only governmental action. The legislative
history is replete with evidence that Congress was moved to act
by several notorious instances of mob violence against blacks and
their supporters, and that the drafting of the statute was carefully
tuned to reach that type of private conduct. 9
The Griffin Court thus rejected the earlier view that § 1985(3)'s
equality language required state action, but in the place of this
requirement the Court held that the equality language required that
the conspiracy be motivated by some sort of class-based animus. In
fact, the Court has not recognized any animus other than racial
animus as satisfying this requirement for a § 1985(3) cause of action, and in Bray the Court characterized the Griffin Court's possible extension of § 1985(3) beyond race as "speculative." 96 While the
class-based animus requirement is presented as an interpretation of
the statute's equality language, it is justified primarily by the
Court's professed concern not to create a "general federal tort law"
under § 1985(3). 9' In fact, the Court does not pretend that the 1871
Congress intended to limit § 1985(3)'s reach to conspiracies with
racial or closely analogous discriminatory motivations. Rather, it
9'See § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified at 42 USC § 1983, discussed in
Griffin, 403 US at 99.
95See note 25 and accompanying text. See also Gormley, 64 Tex L Rev at 565 (cited in
note 24); Schatz, 27 BC L Rev at 928-29 (cited in note 88); Alfred Avins, The Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action and the FourteenthAmendment, I1 St Louis U
L J 331, 411-13 (1967). The Griffin Court also relied upon the hindrance clause, and the
provision of the 1871 Civil Rights Act authorizing presidential use of military force if the
local government authorities are overwhelmed by private lawlessness to establish that Congress addressed conspiracies directed at interfering with government in other provisions.
See Griffin, 403 US at 99. This supports the argument that the conspiracy and disguise
provisions were intended to reach purely private conduct.
96Bray, 113 S Ct at 759.
97See Griffin, 403 US at 101-02.
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holds out the class-based animus requirement primarily as a way
to avoid turning the statute into a "general federal tort law."98
The legislative history of § 1985(3) is mixed on whether Congress
intended to require class-based animus for a § 1985(3) action, but
there is little if any support for limiting eligible classes to racial or
closely analogous ones. The most explicit discussion of the issue
refers to Democrats, Vermonters, and other groups not racial or
similar to racial groups in character, and states that members of
such groups would be able to take advantage of § 1985(3) if99their
federal rights were attacked because of their group identity.
The text of § 1985(3) also provides some evidence that Congress
did not seek to impose a requirement of class-based animus at all.
The statute reaches conspiracies directed at "any person or class
of persons." By expressing itself in the disjunctive here, Congress
provided that the conspiracy need not be directed at a "class" but
could be motivated by the desire to deny rights to a single person. 0° It would be strange for Congress to state that the conspiracy
could be directed at a single person in the first part of a phrase and
then in the very next words in the same phrase completely contradict the earlier language by requiring class-based animus. Reading
the word "equal" to require class-based animus reinserts what Congress specifically stated was not necessary-that the conspiracy be
directed at a class of persons.
ii. Although the Griffin Court appears to have firmly rejected the
state action requirement of Collins, the ghost of the Collins Court's
views regarding Congress's power to reach private conspiracies still
haunts § 1985(3) in the form of the Court's subsequent holding
that private conspirators cannot be sued for interfering with rights
protected constitutionally only against state action. Recall that the
Court's primary justification for holding in Collins that the statute
reached only government action was the constitutional question
regarding congressional power that would arise if § 1985(3) were
construed to reach private conduct that did not at least purport to
98Id at 102, quoted in Bray, 113 S Ct at 759.
' Senator Edmunds remarked that if there were a conspiracy against a person "because
he was a democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a
methodist, or because he was a Vermonter . . . then this section could reach it." Cong
Globe, 42d Cong, Ist Sess, at 567 (quoted in Bray, 113 S Ct at 773, Souter, J, concurring

in part and dissenting in part).
'00Again, "equal" refers to the rights of the victim as opposed to the rights of non-victims.
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be aimed at affecting government action. 101 In Griffin, after holding
that § 1985(3) was intended to reach private conduct, the Court
asked whether Congress had the power to do so, 10 2 since § 1985(3)'s
criminal counterpart had been struck down by the Court on the
ground that Congress lacked the power to reach private conduct
in civil rights laws. 103 The Court in Griffin looked for constitutional
power to reach the precise conspiracy alleged in the case and found
that, since the conspiracy involved assaulting blacks who were
riding in an automobile with a white civil rights worker from a
neighboring state, the conspiracy could be reached under the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel."° The Court specifically stated that it was not reaching any question regarding Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
Contrary to the Griffin Court's language and disclaimer, the
Court later characterized Griffin's reliance on the Thirteenth
Amendment and the right to travel as a holding that § 1985(3) does
not reach private conspiracies against the exercise of constitutional
rights that are capable of violation only by government officials.
For example, the Bray Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim there that
§ 1985(3) was violated by Operation Rescue's conspiracy to deprive
them of the opportunity to choose to have abortions on the ground
that the right to abortion is not protected by § 1985(3) against a
private conspiracy. 105 This is in accord with its earlier rejection in
Carpenters v Scott of a First Amendment claim under § 1985(3)
against a purely private conspiracy.0 6 Carpentersmarked a retreat
from Groifln's holding that § 1985(3) was intended to reach private
conspiracies, and in practice it eliminates most of the potential
reach of the statute. The Court is now basically in the same place it
'0' Collins, 341 US at 659.
10'See Griffin, 403 US at 104.
103See United States v Harris, 106 US 629 (1883).
'04 The Court held that Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment was
broad enough to reach such a conspiracy under its new, more expansive view, that the
Thirteenth Amendment power included power to "determine what are the badges and
incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation." See Jones v Alfred Mayer Co., 392 US at 440, quoted in Griffin, 403 US at 105. The
Court also held that the complaint raised the possibility that the plaintiffs' "right to travel
interstate was one of the rights meant to be discriminatorily impaired by the conspiracy."
Griffin, 403 US at 106.
0 See Bray, 113 S Ct at 764.
106Id, following Carpenters, 463 US at 833.

BRAY v ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH

225

was before Griffin, with § 1985(3) practically useless against private
conspiracies that threaten constitutionally protected interests.
A close examination of the elements of a § 1985(3) civil action is
necessary to understand why this is so. The elements of a claim
against a conspiracy under the primary requirements of § 1985(3)
are: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving "any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws"; (3) an act in furtherance
of the conspiracy; and either (4a) an injury to the plaintiff's person
or property or (4b) a deprivation of the plaintiff's "having and
07
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."1
Element (1) is satisfied by a private conspiracy. Element (2) is satisfied, according to Grffin, if the conspiracy is motivated by "racial,
or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" and if it is directed at preventing the plaintiffs, because of
their race or perhaps other group membership, from enjoying legal
rights such as free speech, association, and movement. 108 The Griffin Court appeared to conclude, then, that § 1985 (3), as a statutory
matter, reached private conspiracies to deprive people of rights
protected constitutionally only against state interference, such as
speech, assembly, and association. Element (3) is satisfied by any
overt act by the private conspiracy in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Element (4) is satisfied either by an injury to the victim's person
or property (which a private conspiracy can clearly accomplish) or
by a deprivation of a right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States. The second alternative of this last element may only be
susceptible of satisfaction by state action except with regard to
those few constitutional rights that can be violated by private action
(like the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel), but any
personal or property injury will satisfy the first alternative of this
element anyway, so this is only a slight limitation on the statute's
reach.
The Court in Carpentersmisinterpreted the Griffin Court's reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel to uphold the constitutionality of § 1985(3)'s application to private conduct as a statutory requirement (perhaps under element (2)) that
107See

Giffin, 403 US at 102-03, cited with approval in Carpenters, 463 US at 828-29.

Quotes are from § 1985(3), as quoted in Griffin.
108See Griffin, 403 US at 102-03.
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the private conspiracy violate a right susceptible of private violation. The Griffin Court never stated this as an element of the statutory cause of action, but the Carpenters Court appeared, in line
with the earlier Court's view in Collins,1" to interpret the equal
protection language to require state involvement for causes of action founded on infringement of rights protected only against state
violation.110 This reasoning marks a partial rejection of Griffin, and
an embracing of the reasoning in Collins that the Griffin Court had
appeared to reject.
Rather than re-institute state action as an element of most
§ 1985(3) actions, the CarpentersCourt should have asked whether
Congress has constitutional power to reach conspiracies that have
as their purpose the prevention (perhaps by a protected group) of
the exercise of a right granted by the Constitution as recognized
by the Supreme Court. Even if private conspiracies cannot violate
the Fourteenth or First Amendments, Congress might have the
power under the Fourteenth to proscribe private interference with
those rights that the Court has held may not be denied by government.
While the debates in Congress and the language of the statute
are not crystal clear on this point, the only way to make sense of
a § 1985(3) that reaches purely private conspiracies is to construe
it to reach private conspiracies that threaten interests recognized
as constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Reconstruction-era Congress intended to reach private conspiracies, and it did not mean to reach only conspiracies that violated the right to travel or the Thirteenth Amendment. While the
debates show some consciousness of the issue, the forty-second
Congress could not have known what ultimately would become
the intricacies of Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine, the
limited reach of the Thirteenth Amendment in its early years or
the fact that the right to travel would, almost 100 years later, be
recognized a right capable of violation by private individuals."1 '
109See Collins, 341 US at 651 (relying on equal protection and equal privileges and immunities language to hold that state action is necessary for a violation of § 1985(3)).
110See Carpenters,463 US at 831-32.
,' The state-action-only reach of the Fourteenth Amendment was recognized at least as
far back as United States v Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 554-55 (1876). See also Virginia v Rives,
100 US 313 (1879) ("these provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have reference to state
action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals"). The Court implied in
United States v Harris, 106 US 629, 641 (1883), that the Thirteenth Amendment reached
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Congress was worried about private mob violence against protected
groups, and it was concerned that mobs were thwarting the local
justice system by taking the law into their own hands and depriving
arrestees of the right to due process, a right that is protected constitutionally only against government deprivation. Congress was attempting, in § 1985(3), to ensure that federal judicial relief was
available against private attempts to prevent people from exercising
the rights that the Fourteenth Amendment granted them against
public denial. "2 Whether Congress has the power to do that has not
been resolved because of the CarpentersCourt's misinterpretation of
Griffin's reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment and right to travel
to uphold § 1985(3) as a statutory interpretation.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to address exhaustively Congress's power to reach private conduct that interferes
with the exercise of rights recognized under the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is strong support for such a power in the reasoning underlying the Court's recent jurisprudence on § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has, for the past thirty years,
recognized much greater latitude for Congress than under its original view that Congress had power only to remedy actual violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 The Court has allowed Congress
not only the power to remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendprivate conduct, and stated so more explicitly in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 23 (1883).
See also Clyatt v United States, 197 US 207 (1905). Not until United States v Guest, 383 US
745, 759-69 & 759n 17 (1966), did the Court hold that the right to travel extended to private
conduct. See also id at 762-74 (Harlan, J, concurring) (arguing that right to travel should
not apply against private interference). If the forty-second Congress knew that state action
was required to make out a § 1985(3) action against a private conspiracy, it was knowingly
engaged in virtually futile lawmaking.
..
2 Congress meant by "equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities"
that all citizens should enjoy the same rights and freedoms as all others, and the mob should
not be able to prevent any person from acting in accordance with those rights that were
recognized as the rights of citizens under federal law. Hardyman, 183 F2d at 312-14.
113See notes 35-52 and accompanying text. As noted, the Court now equates the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power with other legislative powers granted in Article I,
and it has held that congressional judgments under the Fourteenth Amendment are entitled
to the same judicial deference as legislation passed under Article I's Necessary and Proper
Clause. Justice Brennan, concurring in UnitedStates v Guest, 383 US 745, 784 (1966), argued
that "§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears as a positive grant of legislative power,
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and
political equality for all citizens.... [N]o principle of federalism nor word of the Constitution... denies Congress the power to determine that in order adequately to protect the
right to equal utilization of state facilities, it is also appropriate to punish other individualsnot state officers themselves and not acting in concert with state officers-who engage in
the same brutal conduct for the same misguided purpose."
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ment but also the power to identify and define threats to the interests protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 The Court has
emphatically stated that Congress may legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment even where it is certain that the Court would
not find a constitutional violation. "5 Under this reasoning, there
is reason to believe that the Court would uphold Congress's decision, in § 1985(3), to protect constitutionally recognized interests
against private interference.
There are at least two serious interpretive difficulties with this
construction of § 1985(3) and Congress's power. The first is how
to distinguish a violation of § 1985(3) from a mill run conspiracy
against person or property. The Court has, in many different contexts within civil rights litigation, expressed concern that civil
rights actions not displace state authority over tort law and criminal
law. Protecting legitimate state authority over these areas has been
the most commonly cited reason for construing civil rights legisla116
tion, and even underlying constitutional provisions, narrowly.
For example, if a gang steals an automobile, under the interpretation of § 1985(3) offered here, could the victim state a claim for a
conspiracy to deprive the victim of property without due process
of law?
The Court need not impose a strict state action requirement to
prevent § 1985(3) from swallowing large portions of state tort law.
Rather, this problem should be addressed by requiring, consistent
with § 1985(3)'s language, that the defendants act with the purpose,
in the sense of specific intent, to prevent the plaintiffs from exercising a constitutional right." 7 For example, Operation Rescue acts
with the specific purpose or specific intent to prevent women from
exercising their right to have an abortion. By contrast, the ordinary
crime or tort is not motivated by a purpose or intent to prevent
the victim from exercising a constitutional right. The mugger's
See Katzenbacb v Morgan, 384 US 641 (1966); Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 480 (1980).
See Fullilove, 448 US at 476-81. The Court held that Congress, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, may attack practices that did not involve discriminatory intent but that did
tend, in Congress's opinion, to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.
..
6 See Paul v Davis, 424 US 693 (1976); Carpenters, 463 US at 834-35 (reason for classbased animus requirement is to ensure that § 1985(3) does not become a general federal tort
law).
"' Compare UnitedStates v Guest, 383 US at 753-54 (requiring "specific intent to interfere"
with enumerated rights (relating to enjoyment of public accommodation) for criminal civil
rights violation under 18 USC § 241).
"'
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purpose is not to prevent the victim from enjoying the right to due
process before property is taken but is rather simply to appropriate
the property. Similarly, the burglar does not have the purpose of
avoiding the warrant requirement but rather simply to enter the
home to steal valuables. But Operation Rescue, or a group intent
on preventing a politician from speaking at a public rally, has a
specific purpose to prevent the victim from exercising a right recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment."l' While difficult boundary problems undoubtedly exist in distinguishing ordinary crimes
and torts from those motivated by a purpose of depriving victims'
constitutional rights, attempting to work those problems out would
make '§ 1985(3) a more effective tool in preserving disfavored
groups' ability to enjoy constitutionally recognized liberties.
The purpose requirement should also solve the paradox of private action impairing rights that can only be denied, as a constitutional matter, by the state. It is not that the private conspiracy
itself deprives its victims of their Fourteenth Amendment rights,
it is that private action prevents them from exercising rights that
government is required by law to recognize. Thus, while Operation Rescue may not itself violate women's Fourteenth Amendment
right to have abortions, it certainly has as its purpose interfering
with women's exercise of that right. If a private individual kidnaps
a person on their way to a hearing in court in order to prevent the
hearing from taking place, and the kidnapper's purpose is to see
that a default judgment is entered against the victim, the kidnapper
has prevented the victim from having her day in court, that is,
the kidnapper has at least indirectly deprived the victim of the
opportunity to receive due process of law. Similarly, when a private individual assaults someone who is attempting to make a
speech in a public forum, that private individual has prevented the
victim from exercising his First Amendment right to make a speech
in the public forum." 9 While the notion of a private conspiracy to
"IThe Court in Giffin stated that there is no requirement in § 1985(3) of a specific intent
to deprive a person of a constitutional right. 403 US at 102, n 10. This statement was made
to clarify that the racial animus requirement was distinct from the willfulness requirement
for certain civil rights crimes. Id. The proposal in text is that the Court rethink this interpretation of the purpose requirement.
19 One response to this argument might be that although the private individual should
not be required to violate the Constitution, there should at least be a requirement that the
conspiracy be directed at somehow preventing the state from recognizing a right that is
protected constitutionally only against state interference. This is a good argument, but it
makes § 1985(3)'s hindrance provision redundant. In any case, Operation Rescue certainly
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violate rights protected only against government denial might seem
puzzling, it is not conceptually difficult to imagine § 1985(3) functioning as a prophylactic against private efforts to undermine the
actual enjoyment of rights that have been recognized as protected
against government deprivation. 120
The second problem with interpreting § 1985(3) to reach all
conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of any federal constitutional right is that the most natural reading of the statute's equality
language seems to require that the conspiracy be directed at a violation of equal protection or privileges and immunities. In other
words, by its terms, a conspiracy does not violate the statute unless
its purpose was to violate those constitutional provisions mentioned
in the text of the statute and not just any federal right.
While there is some legislative history that supports the view
that the conspiracy must be directed at creating legal inequality
for its victims, 121 the genesis of the statute's equality language supports a much narrower understanding of its import. As originally
proposed, the statute did not contain any reference to equality,
and used language that reached all conspiracies to deprive people
of constitutional rights if the conspirators engaged in conduct that
was criminal under state law. 122 This proposal caused concern in
Congress that a great deal of state criminal and civil jurisdiction
would be shifted to federal courts. This was condemned as beyond
Congress's power in that it created a general criminal and tort
law. 123 While the supporters of § 1985(3) denied that it would have
that effect, or that it was beyond Congress's power to punish and
provide redress against private conspiracies in derogation of constitutional rights, the "equal protection" and "equal privileges and
meets this requirement, since one of its tactics is to close abortion clinics at least temporarily
by overwhelming the local authorities who might otherwise attempt to preserve the right.
And in at least one instance, the local authorities asked the abortion clinic to close during
the Operation Rescue assault since the local authorities could not keep the clinic free of
trespassers. See Bray, 113 S Ct at 780-82 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
120See Lawrence, 67 Tulane L Rev at 2213-18 (cited in note 8) (arguing for a similar
intent test for civil rights crimes).
121See Griffin, 403 US at 100, quoting Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess, App 188 (remarks
of Rep. Willard), App 478 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger "that he may not enjoy equality
of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens' rights").
121See Cogan, 39 Rutgers L Rev at 557-58 (cited in note 81); Fockele, Comment, 46 U
Chi L Rev at 412-14 (cited in note 88).
123See Cong Globe at App 153; Cogan, 39 Rutgers L Rev at 562-63 (cited in note 81);
Gormley, 64 Tex L Rev at 537-38 (cited in note 24); Fockele, Comment, 46 U Chi L Rev
at 417-18 (cited in note 88).
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immunities" language was added to clarify that only conspiracies
directed at federal rights were addressed by the statute.12 4 Those
that offered the amendment did not express the belief that the
amendment made a substantive change.12 Some Members of Congress adopted the state action interpretation and explained the statute as addressing conspiracies to use state instrumentalities to deny
equal rights.' 26 But it was not viewed that way by others, including
a group in Congress that believed strongly in federal power to
reach private conspiracies against constitutional rights. This group
saw the equality language as merely providing a more explicit con27
stitutional basis for the statute in the Equal Protection Clause.1
But they did not think that by inserting the equality language the
reach of the statute was being limited to a subset of constitutional
rights or to conspiracies among public officials. Further, the framers of the statute had a different understanding of the meaning of
equal protection and privileges and immunities than we have today,
and the legislative history indicates that they used these phrases as
shorthand for Fourteenth Amendment rights generally. 128 There is
no indication, moreover, that the equality language was meant to
limit the statute's application to conspiracies against blacks or other
highly suspect classifications.
Insofar as the goal of preventing § 1985(3) from becoming a
general federal tort law could be achieved by limiting the statute's
reach to conspiracies motivated by a desire to prevent the exercise
of federal rights, which is what the framers of the provision intended when they added the equality language, the fear of a general
federal tort law is misplaced.' 29 With § 1985(3) limited to cases in
124HR 320, Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess, 317 (1871). For an in-depth analysis of the
legislative debates preceding the Ku Klux Klan Act, see Cogan, 39 Rutgers L Rev at 556-69
(cited in note 81). See also Avins, 11 St Louis U LJ at 331-32 (cited in note 95).
125Cogan, 39 Rutgers L Rev at 563-64 (cited in note 81). These people thought that
equality referred simply to the fact that people unaffected by the conspiracy were free to
act in ways that victims of the conspiracy were not.
126Fockele, Comment, 46 U Chi L Rev at 418 (cited in note 88).
127Cogan, 39 Rutgers L Rev at 562-65 (cited in note 81); Fockele, Comment, 46 U Chi
L Rev at 418-20 (cited in note 88). See generally Janis L McDonald, Startingfrom Scratcb:
A Revisionist View of 42 USC § 198S(3) and Class-BasedAnimus, 19 U Conn L Rev 471,481-83
(1987).
128See Avins, 11 St Louis U L J at 411-25 (cited in note 95) (discussing "equal pro-

tection").
129As it is in other contexts in which it is invoked. See Jack M. Beermann, Government
Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 BU L Rev
277, 326-29 (1988).
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which federal rights are under attack, there would be no general
federal tort law developed, and the class-based animus requirement
130
could be abandoned.
III
The Court in Bray rejected arguments that a conspiracy to
prevent women from exercising their right to have an abortion was
class-based animus against women, that animus against the class
of women seeking abortions was sufficient for the purposes of
§ 1985(3), that interfering with women who had crossed state lines
to seek their abortion violated the right to travel, and that the
private conspiracy interfered with the Fourteenth Amendment
right to choose abortion. The Court did, however, reaffirm its
earlier holding in Griffin v Breckenridge that § 1985(3) reached a
broader set of private conspiracies than those tending to dominate
state government. 131 This section looks more closely at the Court's
rejection of the plaintiffs' claims in Bray and discusses whether,
under the reinterpretation of § 1985(3) discussed above, the Court
in Bray should have recognized the plaintiffs' claims.
A

In Bray, the plaintiffs claimed that Operation Rescue's purpose
to prevent abortions was animus against women generally and if
not, then the class of women seeking abortions satisfied the class
requirement. The Court rejected both these arguments, holding
that opposition to abortion was not animus against women, that
the class of women seeking abortions was not a proper class for
§ 1985(3) purposes, and that it was still unclear, in any case, that
§ 1985(3) applied beyond the racial context.
While I have argued above that the class-based animus requirement should be abandoned, the Court is unlikely to do so. How130"Equal protection and equal privileges and immunities" would still have meaning in
the statute. As expressed during the legislative debates, the equality language would refer
to the fact that the victims of the conspiracy have unequal rights when compared to nonvictims.
...
See Bray, 113 S Ct at 758. In an uncharacteristically careless use of language, Justice
Scalia stated that Griffin, "reversing a 20-year-old precedent" held that § 1985(3) reaches
purely private conspiracies. Id. Griffin did not reverse Collins, nor did it overrule it. It did,
however, state that it was no longer good law on the private conspiracy question.
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ever, even with such a requirement, there is no good reason to
confine § 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated by racial animus. Every
indication is that Congress foresaw a broader reach for the statute. 132 Congress knew, when it used general, all-encompassing language, that it was not confining its Reconstruction-era civil rights
statutes to protecting blacks, and it sometimes referred to race
when it found it necessary or appropriate.' 33 Further, the Equal
Protection Clause itself has been extended far beyond race alone,
and it would be ironic if a statute passed to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause did not reach as broadly as the constitutional
clause itself.
Under an only slightly expanded view of class-based animus,
animus directed against women should satisfy the requirement, and
preventing women from obtaining abortions should be viewed as
animus directed at women. Only women can have abortions, and
by targeting a right that only women can exercise, Operation Rescue is engaged in a conspiracy against women.
The Court relies on two justifications for rejecting the claim that
Operation Rescue's efforts to prevent women from exercising the
right to have abortions is class-based animus against women. First,
the Court appears to rely on a definition of class-based animus that
involves more than a decision to treat the victims unequally. Justice
Scalia's opinion for the Court states that there are reasons for opposing abortion "other than hatred of or condescension toward...
' This view is further supported by the Court's
women as a class."134
observation that women are on both sides of the abortion issuewomen opposing abortion, according to the Court, apparently
could not be motivated by hatred or condescension toward women.
"' See Schatz, 27 BC L Rev at 928-33 (cited in note 88) (nothing in language of statute
or historical materials supports proposition that class-based animus was thought to be exclusively racial animus or that animus directed at groups defined by their economic views, or

other non-racial, non-political characteristics, was excluded from the statutes coverage);
Fockele, Comment, 46 U Chi L Rev at 402-03 (cited in note 88); McDonald, 19 U Conn

L Rev at 484-85 (cited in note 127).
133See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch 114, 18 Stat 335 (1875); Enforcement Act of
1870, ch 114, 16 Stat 140, amended by Act of Feb 28, 1871, ch 99, 16 Stat 433; Civil Rights
Act (Enforcement Act) of 1866, ch 31, 14 Stat 27. Also contrast with civil rights statutes
from the 1960s which singled out certain classes for special protection.
134Bray, 113 S Ct at 760. It is difficult to understand how Operation Rescue, by not
allowing women to make the abortion decision themselves, is not motivated at least by

condescension toward them. See Cohen, 3 ColumJ Gender & Law (cited in note 2), arguing
that abortion regulation interferes with women's decision-making autonomy.

234

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1993

The Court's discussion here implies that some sort of ill-will or
spite is required to establish class-based animus under § 1985(3).
The Bray Court thus appears to have tightened up further on
the availability of the § 1985(3) action by requiring, under the
class-based animus requirement, even more than what would be
required to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court is looking for evidence that the conspiracy was motivated by a dislike for the victimized group. The Equal Protection
Clause, by contrast, is violated by an intent to treat a group differently without sufficient justification. Equal protection jurisprudence focuses not on motivation but merely on intent to treat differently.
Justice Scalia also relies on the Court's holdings that classifications based on pregnancy do not constitute discrimination based
on sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.13 Besides the
fact that the Court's view that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex discrimination was quickly rebuffed by Congress,136 it is unclear why the constitutional definition of discrinination applies here with full force, but does not apply either to
determine what motivation is required under § 1985(3) or to determine what classes satisfy the requirement of class-based animus.
Justice Scalia illustrates that opposition to abortion is not directed
at women as a class since not all women seek abortions with the
example of a tax on wearing yarmulkes, which he states is a tax
on Jews. 37
' But just as not all women seek abortions, not all Jews
wear yarmulkes, 138 and the reason a tax on yarmulkes appears to
be a tax on Jews is that only Jews wear yarmulkes, just as only
women can have abortions. Either Justice Scalia's example is
wrong, or the Court is wrong to hold that preventing the exercise

" See Bray, 113 S Ct at 760, citing Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484 (1974). A growing
scholarly opinion is that the best constitutional basis for protecting the right of women to
have abortions lies in principles of equality. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
ConditionsDoctrineIs an Anacbronism (with ParticularReference to Religion, Speech and Abortion),
70 BU L Rev 593 (1990); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v Wade, 63 NC L Rev 375 (1985).
"' See PL 95-555, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat 2076, amending
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy and thereby overrule General Electric v Gilbert, 429 US 125 (1976).
...
See 113 S Ct at 760.
138Some who wish to keep their heads covered wear other kinds of hats with or without
a yarmulke underneath, and some Jews do not care about wearing a yarmulke at all.
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of a right possessed by only a specific class of people is not discrimination against that group.
The Bray plaintiffs also argued that the group of women seeking
abortions constituted a class under § 1985(3). The Court rejected
this argument, based on the Court's rejection in Carpenters of the
class of non-union workers who sued after they were assaulted by
union members because of their lack of union membership. The
CarpentersCourt held that even if § 1985(3) were construed to reach
a broad range of classes including political associations, it was not
intended to reach discrimination based on economic views or status. 139 The Bray Court's analysis of this issue is as follows:
Whatever may be the precise meaning of a "class" for purposes of Griffin's speculative extension of § 1985(3) beyond race,
the term unquestionably connotes something more that a group
of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that
the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors. Otherwise, innumerable tort
plaintiffs would be able to assert causes of action under
§ 1985(3) by simply defining the aggrieved class as those seeking
to engage in the activity the defendant interfered with. This
definitional ploy would convert the statute into the "general
tort law" it was the very purpose of the animus requirement to
avoid. As Justice Blackmun has cogently put it, the class "cannot be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious
action." Carpenters, supra, 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J. dis14
senting). "Women seeking abortion" is not a qualifying class. '
This reasoning is a significant extension of Carpentersbecause it
appears to reject all classifications not based on immutable characteristics such as race. In Carpenters, the Court rejected only classifications based on economic views, status, or activities and left open
the issue of whether § 1985(3) reaches political associations, religious groups, or state citizenship.' 41 As noted above, there is support in the legislative history for holding that Congress intended
for § 1985(3) to cover actions based on political associations and
42
other non-immutable classifications.
,,Contrary to Justice Scalia'a characterization, women seeking
abortion are not a class defined merely because they wish to engage
See Carpenters, 463 US at 837-39.
"4 Bray, 113 S Ct at 759 (citation omitted).
"9

'4'

See Carpenters, 463 US at 836-37.

142See supra note 128.
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in conduct that Operation Rescue disfavors. Rather, they are defined as a class by their attempt to exercise a right that has been
recognized as constitutionally protected and fundamental. And
their efforts to exercise this right are threatened in much the same
way that the Ku Klux Klan threatened blacks who wished to work,
associate, and vote as free citizens, in an atmosphere of violence in
which local authorities are sometimes unable or unwilling to ensure
that the rights can be acted upon.'4 3 Only strong hostility to the
right to abortion could blind the Court to the difference between
everyday tort victims and women seeking to exercise their fundamental right to choose abortion.
B

As noted, the Bray Court rejected the arguments that a private
conspiracy could violate women's right to choose abortion and that
preventing both in-staters and out-of-staters from having abortions
violated the out-of-staters' right to travel. The rejection of the claim
that Operation Rescue interfered with the plaintiffs' right to have
abortions was premised on the CarpentersCourt's categorical rejection of § 1985(3) claims against private conspiracies alleging violations of rights protected "only against state interference.' 44 One
faulty basis for the CarpentersCourt's decision is discussed abovethe Court equated Griffin's holding that the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel, both protected against private conduct, provided a constitutional basis for § 1985(3) actions against
private conspiracies with a holding that § 1985(3) reached private
conspiracies only when they violated such rights. As applied in
Bray, this reasoning led the Court to conclude that "the statute
does not apply ... to private conspiracies that are 'aimed at a right
3 Some localities have been very effective at dealing with Operation Rescue and keeping
abortion facilities open. See Operation Rescue Suspends Protestsin Buffalo, Los Angeles Times
(April 30, 1992), p 33; Operation Rescue's Mission to Save Itself Legal Challenges
, The
Washington Post (Nov 24, 1991), p aO1; Clinics Poised to Combat Antiabortion Protesters,The
Washington Post (july 10, 1993), p a03. Other communities have not been so effective,
mainly because they are overwhelmed by the numbers and tactics of anti-abortion protesters.
See Bray, 113 S Ct, at 781-82 (Stevens, J, dissenting); Anti Abortion Group Shuts Down
Delaware Clinic, Philadelphia Inquirer (July 11, 1993), p A01; Operation Rescue Rally Closes
Santa Ana Clinic, Los Angeles Times (Dec 9, 1990), p 48. Since the right to abortion is
imposed on the states from above, the Court's working assumption should be hostility to
the right on the part of the local authorities, just as Congress and some members of the
Court have remained hostile to the right.
144 Carpenters, 463 US at 831-34.
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interference.'
that is by definition a right only against state
145
The right to abortion is not among them."'
The Court in Carpentershad also relied on the fact that under its
jurisprudence, § 1985(3) does not create any rights but rather is
designed merely to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; the rights
asserted in the § 1985(3) action must be found in the amendment
itself, which does not protect against private conduct. The Court
rejected equating § 1985(3) to statutes passed under the Commerce
Clause that create rights.
The Court has not seriously considered the possibility of a middle position under which, while § 1985(3) does not create any new
substantive rights, it does provide an action against private conspiracies to prevent its victims from exercising recognized constitutional rights. There is no logical fallacy in the idea that a private
conspiracy might prevent people from enjoying rights protected
only against the state. For example, when a person is lynched while
awaiting trial, it is accurate to state that the victim was prevented
from exercising the right to trial. While it is true that the right to
a fair trial is protected constitutionally only against state deprivation, it does not seem strange to state that the action of the private
lynch party interfered with that right. The vision of rights is not
merely that the state does not interfere with certain actions, it is
that people are generally free to exercise their freedoms.
It is easier to conceive of private interference with some constitutional rights than with others. It is more difficult, for example, to
imagine private interference with the right to be indicted before
being put on trial than to imagine private interference with the
right to speak. The former is a procedural right that arises only in
the context of one's relationship to the government, while the latter
involves freedom of action that need not implicate government.' 46
The right to abortion, like speech, involves an activity that is
wholly separate from government, and it makes sense to say that
145Bray, 113 S Ct at 764, quoting Carpenters, 463 US at 833.
"4 Because the First Amendment right itself may be susceptible of violation only by
government, this analysis goes against our usual Hohfeldian way of thinking about rights.
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L J 16 (1913). Put succinctly, the argument is that a private person or
group can interfere with a right that does not run against them in the sense of creating a
duty to honor the right in the strictest sense. See id. See also Joseph William Singer, The
Legal Rights Debate in AnalyticalJurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wisc L Rev 975.
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a person is not fully able to enjoy the right to abortion if private
parties prevent abortions from taking place.
This view of the role of remedial provisions in vindicating constitutional rights was adopted by the Supreme Court in construing a
portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that guarantees equal rights
in the purchase of real property. In Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co., 147
the defendants argued that the statute's guarantee of equal rights
did not apply to private discrimination, since only state actors
could actually affect the "right" to own property. The Court rejected this argument and held that the statute prohibited private
discrimination in transactions involving real property. The Court
reasoned, as Members of Congress argued in support of the provision, that private interference could prevent blacks from enjoying
the benefits of equal rights, and that this was a legitimate target
of legislation. 148 The Reconstruction Congress recognized that the
enjoyment of equal rights depended both on elimination of government discrimination and private interference. 149
Thus, it makes sense to state that Operation Rescue interferes
with women's right to have abortions. The problem that led to the
passage of § 1985(3) was not state denial of rights, it was private
interference with the ability of people to exercise their rights. Congress saw a significant risk that private resistance would frustrate
full enjoyment of federally protected rights, especially for the
newly freed slaves, fears that with hindsight we can say were justified. The Reconstruction-era Congress repeatedly acted against private conduct that interfered with the exercise of rights or discriminated against blacks, because the Congress recognized that full
enjoyment of constitutional rights required that both public and
private conduct be regulated. The Court's rejection of these efforts,
based mainly on a narrow view of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers and more recently on crabbed readings of the Reconstruction-era statutes, has been a substantial barrier to fulfillment
'47

392 US 409 (1968).

141See id at 432-44.
149See also United States v Guest, 383 US at 778-78 (Brennan, J, concurring). It may seem

odd that private individuals' conduct in a situation not involving state action could raise
concerns relating to rights protected only against government interference. But unless one
adopts a very narrow view both of the nature of rights and of Congress's power under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it should not seem strange that Congress would be concerned with
the actual exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, especially in a period of intense private
resistance to the recognition and exercise of those rights.
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of Congress's vision and implementation of the plan of full- enjoyment of rights for all. Once the Court recognized that § 1985(3)
was plainly intended to reach private conspiracies, it should have
given more thought to the universe of rights that Congress intended
to protect.
The Bray plaintiffs, aware that the courts were unlikely to abandon the bar against actions challenging private conspiracies to vindicate rights constitutionally protected only against public deprivation, raised, in addition to the right to abortion, the right to travel,
which the Supreme Court has held is subject to private deprivation.
The lower courts accepted the plaintiffs' argument that the right
to travel was violated by Operation Rescue since many people
seeking abortions in the area that was the subject of the suit traveled
from out of state to do so.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that
there was no indication that in-staters seeking abortion were treated
better than out-of-staters seeking abortion. This conclusion makes
sense in light of the Court's jurisprudence on the right to travel
and also in light of the concern that otherwise the right to travel
would be violated any time a tort or crime was committed against
someone from out of state, or at least any time an out-of-stater was
50
prevented from accomplishing the purpose of the interstate trip.
However, while there are hints to this effect in the Griffin opinion,
that opinion could also be read to hold that the right to travel was
violated as long as the plaintiffs were attempting to travel interstate,
and the conspirators prevented them from doing so because of their
status as blacks, or because they wished to associate with civil
rights workers from out of state. There is no explicit statement in
Griffin that the right to travel is not implicated unless the victims
or white civil rights workers were chosen because the civil rights
worker they associated with was from another state, that is, that
had the civil rights worker been from the same state there would
have been no assault.
The issues regarding the right to travel are not clear cut, and I
do not pretend to resolve them here. The claims against Operation
Rescue, in Bray and other cases, were brought under the right to
travel only because founding the claim on the right to abortion was
a lost cause. It is important for present purposes to note that the
150See

United States v Guest, 383 US 745 (1966); Zobel v Williams, 457 US 55 (1982).
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Court's decision in Bray to require a specific purpose to target
victims because they traveled from out of state is similar in operation to the more general requirement proposed in this article that
the requirement of a conspiracy to deprive the victim of equal
protection or privileges and immunities be met whenever the plaintiff's purpose is to prevent or punish the exercise of constitutional
rights. Just as a plaintiff in a right-to-travel case must prove that
she was chosen because she had traveled interstate, so to should a
plaintiff prevail if he shows that he was chosen because he was
exercising a constitutional right.
C

The purpose requirement proposed above would preserve
§ 1985(3)'s effectiveness as a tool to ensure complete enjoyment of
constitutional rights, would not displace a great deal of state authority over torts or crimes appropriately within state control, and
would make more sense out of Congress's intent to reach private
conspiracies with § 1985(3). The Bray plaintiffs would have to
prove that Operation Rescue acted for the purpose of preventing
them from exercising their constitutional right to have abortions,
a showing that would be easy given the facts of the case. This
purpose requirement would distinguish proper § 1985(3) actions
from ordinary torts that happen to interfere with constitutionally
protected interests. For example, a conspiracy to assault a person
on the way to the voting booth would violate § 1985(3) only if it
could be shown that the conspirators' purpose was to prevent the
victim from voting, even if in either case the effect was to prevent
the victim from voting.
Because the class-based animus requirement was created to avoid
creating "a general federal tort law," 15' it should be abandoned in
favor of Congress's intent that a much broader class of plaintiffs
than racial groups be able to use § 1985(3). The purpose requirement takes care of the "federal tort law" problem. In Bray, this
would mean that it would be of no moment that discrimination
against women is not racially motivated, or that discrimination
against women seeking abortions might not be discrimination based
1. See Griffin, 403 US at 101 (imposing class-based animus requirement to avoid creating
a general federal tort law).
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an immutable classification. Even if the Court adheres to its requirement of class-based animus, it should not confine the statute
to racial classes, and should recognize that regulation of abortion
is directed at women and that women seeking abortions are the
sort of class that the 1871 Congress intended to protect.
It is unlikely, however, that the Court will take these steps. The
Court is likely to perpetuate its Civil War ancestors' determination
to prevent Congress from effectively dealing with state and private
resistance to the full enjoyment of constitutional rights, and appears prepared even to resist more recent congressional
efforts to
15 2
address the continuing practice of discrimination.
IV
The primary focus of this article has been the treatment of
§ 1985(3) by the Supreme Court, and has proceeded largely by
examining the important cases and criticizing them on doctrinal
grounds. The main point that has been arrived at through this
analysis is that the federalism and other reasons the Court has given
for its narrow readings of § 1985(3) do not sufficiently justify those
readings. Specifically, if § 1985(3) plaintiffs were required to prove
that the conspirators' purpose was to prevent them from exercising
a recognized constitutional right, there would be no danger that
§ 1985(3) would become a general tort law and displace state authbrity over relations among private individuals. Such a purpose
requirement would confine § 1985(3) actions to the sphere in which
Congress has legitimate interest-ensuring that federal constitutional rights can actually be enjoyed, and that private resistance
does not frustrate the goals of federal law.
Of course, there is plenty of room for disagreement about the
desirability of the class-based animus requirement and the requirement that § 1985(3) actions against private parties involve a constitutional right that is capable of violation by private action. Section
1985(3)'s equality language and the references in the legislative history even support the notion that some group-based motivation
must lie behind the conspirators' actions, although there is little
support for limiting the statute to racial groups. However, it seems
very unlikely that the explanation for the requirements the Court
Is2 See notes 154-57.
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has imposed that render § 1985(3) almost useless against private
conspiracies lies in competing understandings of the language, history, or social context of § 1985(3).
The Court's treatment of § 1985(3) is part of a familiar pattern,
dating back to the Reconstruction era, of resisting the aims and
operation of civil rights legislation. The Reconstruction-era Congress, and Congresses during the more recent civil rights movement, attempted to work great changes in the legal aspects of civil
rights, and their efforts have been thwarted at almost every turn
by a Court that has either held their efforts unconstitutional or
construed statutory language as narrowly as possible.
In fact, even under a narrow view of Congress's authority to
reach private conduct, Congress might have wanted to legislate
against both public and private threats to constitutional rights, and
should have the authority to do so. Without such legislation, actual
Fourteenth Amendment violations might go unremedied if state
resistance to Fourteenth Amendment rights hides behind, or acts
in concert with, private conduct. In addition, Congress might conclude that prohibiting private threats to rights protected only
against government interference would safeguard those rights by
creating a buffer zone around them.
It is perhaps understandable that the modern Court would be
reluctant to apply nineteenth-century civil rights statutes broadly,
since they represented a political consensus from the distant past
and were written under a narrower understanding of the scope of
rights upon which civil rights actions might be predicated."5 3 And
for a time, it appeared that the Court was much more receptive to
more recent civil rights legislation, applying statutes like Title VII
broadly to achieve their goals. 154 However, in recent years, the
Court has repeatedly interpreted Title VII against plaintiffs, not
only on new issues but also by retreating on prior, pro-plaintiff,
decisions.'
And even after Congress in 1991 sent the Court a
153For a theory on how to interpret old statutes in light of current conditions, see William
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479 (1987).
"' See Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424 (1971); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411
US 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248 (1981) (burdens in
Title VII). But see St. Mary's Honor Center v Hicks, 113 S Ct 2742 (1993). Compare treatment
of § 1983 as not overruling the Eleventh Amendment in Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651
(1974) with the Court's allowing Congress to override the Eleventh Amendment in the
amendments tp Title VII in Fitzpatrickv Bitzer, 427 US 445 (1976).
15' The Civil Rights Act of 1991, PL 102-166, was designed to restore and strengthen
civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment. The bill was offered to specifically
overrule aspects of the Supreme Court's decisions in Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491
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resounding message that it was out of touch with Congress's views
on employment discrimination,' 6 the Court has continued to chart
ls7
its own, more conservative, course on Title VII.
It is a strength of the separation of powers and judicial independence in the United States that allows a century-long pattern in
the Supreme Court of resistance to civil rights to continue. It is a
political reality, however, that judicial independence at the Supreme Court has not overall served the cause of civil rights well.
I do not mean to suggest that the Court has never acted as a progressive force on civil rights or that all of its recent decisions have
gone against civil rights plaintiffs or others asserting constitutional
rights. But there is a pattern of unwillingness on the part of the
Court to reach out to protect unpopular rights, and the Court seems
58
to be at its most active when the rights of white men are at stake.'
Rather than be part of the Reconstruction-era and later Congress's
solution to the problem of civil rights, the Court has been part of
the problem.
US 164 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v Antonio, 490 US 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v
Hopkins, 490 US 228 (1989); Martinv Wilks, 490 US 755 (1989); LorancevAT&T Technologies,
490 US 900 (1989); Crawford Fitting Co. vJ.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 US 437 (1987); Library of
Congres Shaw, 478 US 310 (1986); Evans vjff D., 475 US 717 (1986); Marek v Cbesny 473
US 1 (1985). See also the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, PL 100-259, designed to
overturn the Court's decision in Grove City College v Bell, 465 US 555 (1984).
16 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, PL 102-166.
i" St. Mary's Honor Center v Hicks, 113 S Ct 2742 (1993) (burden of proof in Title VII
cases).
1S8This could be thought to date back to the fact that the first case in which heightened
scrutiny was applied to an equal protection challenge to a gender-based classification was a
case involving discrimination against men. See Craig v Boren, 429 US 190 (1976). More
recently, the Court has been at its most creative in creating new equal protection doctrine
to protect white contractors discriminated against by minority set-aside plans and extending
standing to white contractors in such cases who did not allege that the plan had actually
caused them to lose any contracts. See City ofRichmond v Croson, 488 US 469 (1989); Associated
General Contractorsof America v City ofJacksonville, 113 S Ct 2297 (1993) (standing). See also
Shaw v Reno, 113 S Ct 2816 (1993) (white voters' challenge to redistricting). The federalism
concerns that the Court relies on to justify its narrow reading of civil rights statutes do not
appear to deter the Court from striking down state and local efforts to deal with the legacy
of racial discrimination against blacks and other minority groups. See also Jack Beermann,
Barbara Melamed, and Hugh Hall, The Supreme Court'sTilt to the PropertyRight: Procedural
Due Process Protectionsof Liberty and PropertyInterests, 3 BU Pub Int LJ 9, 29 nn 105-6 (1993)
and accompanying text (comparing Supreme Court decision in which women were held to
have sued too late to challenge a seniority system because they waited until it was applied
to them when they could have sued when it was enacted, with decisions under which white
firefighters who could have challenged an affirmative action plan when it was written were
held to have a due process right to challenge it when it was applied to them).

